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1  Introduction 
In  most  member  states  of  the  European  Union  (EU),  universal  postal  services 
provided by the incumbent operator are exempt from value added taxes (VAT) on 
the grounds that they are the “public postal service.” Other postal service providers 
have to charge VAT at the standard rate. In the United Kingdom (UK), TNT legally 
challenged  this  interpretation  of  the  VAT  Directive1  and  Royal  Mail’s  VAT 
exemption  as  not  being  in  accordance  with  EU  law.  TNT  argued  that  where  the 
market  is  liberalized,  VAT  should  be  charged  on  all  services  to  avoid  market 
distortion. This position had already been taken by some European governments, 
including those of Finland, Sweden and Switzerland.  
The  European  Court  of  Justice  (ECJ)  ruled  that  Royal  Mail,  as  the  operator 
providing the public postal service, was the only postal service provider in the UK 
that was eligible for the VAT exemption. However, this exemption does not apply to 
contracts that had been individually negotiated by businesses with Royal Mail, as 
such an exemption would distort competition. The ECJ’s decision is binding on all 
member states. 
The  significance  of  VAT  exemptions  to  the  emergence  of  competition  in 
liberalized postal markets has not been explicitly analyzed and discussed: while De 
Donder  et  al.  (2009)  focus  on  the  pricing  and  welfare  implications  of  changing  a 
postal operator’s VAT status, Dieke and Elixmann (2005) try to quantify the effect of 
VAT exemptions for postal operators on government tax revenue. Crew et al. (2009) 
discuss  the  importance  of  VAT  exemptions  in  the  framework  of  the  prospective 
study by PwC (2006). 
The focus of our paper is on the competitive effects of the proposed VAT regime 
relative to selected alternatives. We also highlight the welfare effects of various VAT 
scenarios. A priori, the size of these two effects is not clear; while an exempt operator 
cannot reclaim VAT paid on inputs (relevant for non-labor inputs only) and therefore 
faces higher costs ceteris paribus, an important fraction of customers of non-exempt 
operators will not be able to deduct VAT themselves. Hence, the exempt incumbent 
operator  has  on  the  one  hand  a  cost  disadvantage,  and  on  the  other,  a  price 
advantage. The net effect will depend on the fraction of non-labor inputs relative to 
the  fraction  of  non-rated  customers.  Figure  1  below  illustrates  the  trade-off.  The 
circles  represent  the  relevant  market  distortions  raised  by  the  asymmetric  VAT 
exemption.   
We base our analysis on the model developed in Dietl et al. (2010) and quantify 
the effects of selected VAT regimes. We report market shares, optimum prices, tax 
revenue and welfare in a liberalized postal market. The various scenarios differ by 
the  operators’  VAT  status.  We  also  take  into  account  the  fraction  of  non-rated 
customers that cannot deduct VAT themselves.     2 
The  paper  sheds  light  on  the  main  competitive  impact  of  VAT  policies  while 
showing the consequences on overall welfare. Relative to the work of De Donder et 
al. (2009), who assume that entrants act as a competitive fringe, we model profits of 
both  the  incumbent  and  new  market  entrants.  This  allows  us  to  provide  a  more 
comprehensive treatment of competitive effects of VAT policies. We also provide the 
relevant  sensitivity  analysis  with  regards  to  the  fraction  of  labor  inputs  and  the 
fraction of VAT exempt customers. We show that the results are very sensitive to the 
operators’ labor policies. Consequently, VAT exemptions have a different impact in 
countries  with  different  labor  regulations.  Secondly,  the  sensitivity  analysis 
highlights that the competitive effects will vary strongly between different customer 
segments.  Hence  there  is  a  second  important  regulatory  link  between  VAT 
exemptions  and  uniform  pricing  constraints.  The  comprehensive  treatment  of 
competition and welfare enables us to provide guidance on how to resolve the policy 
trade-off between consumer surplus, government tax revenue, and a level playing 
field in liberalized postal markets. 
The  structure  of  the  paper  is  as  follows.  Section  2  summarizes  the  model 
framework as presented in a companion paper (Dietl et al. 2010) and outlines the 
formal results. Section 3 describes the calibration of the model for a stylized postal 
market. Section 4 reports the simulation results. Section 5 provides conclusions.  
2  Model Framework  
In this section, we outline the model framework and summarize the main results.2 
Two  postal  operators,  an  incumbent  operator  I  and  an  entrant  operator  E  offer 
differentiated  mail  services  in  the  same  market.  The  before-tax  price  of  mail  at 
operator i is denoted by i p , whereas  (1 ) i i t p +  denotes the after-tax price of mail at 
operator  i,  with  [0,1] i t ∈   being  the  individual  VAT  rate  of  operator  { , } i E I ∈ . 
Moreover,  each  operator  pays  VAT  denoted  by  [0,1] t∈   on  non-labor  inputs. 
Depending on their VAT status, operators are able to deduct the input VAT from 
their output VAT billed to the customers. 
In the model, there are two types of customers:  [0,1] γ ∈  denotes the fraction of 
VAT  exempt,  “non-rated”  customers,  while  (1 ) γ −   is  the  proportion  of  customers 
that are VAT rated. The latter type of customers can reclaim the VAT they paid on 
their postal products because these products are an input into their own production 
processes. Reclaiming VAT is not possible for VAT exempt customers. Thus, for VAT 
rated customers, the before-tax price i p  is relevant, while for VAT exempt customers, 
the after-tax price  (1 ) i i p t +  of the mail service from operator i is relevant. The model 
specification  presumes  that  the  fraction  of  non-exempt  letters  is  the  same  for the 
incumbent and the entrant.  
The  model  further  assumes  a  quadratic,  quasi-linear  utility  specification  that 
yields  linear  demand  curves  with  equal  slope  for  both  operators.  Demand  of 
operator i decreases in its own prices i p , while it increases in the price j p of the other     3 
operator j .  Demand  is  also  positively  related  to  a  higher  degree  of  product 
differentiation. 
If operator i is VAT exempt, i.e.,  0 i t = , it does not charge VAT to its customers.  
On the other hand, it does charge VAT to its customers if it is VAT rated, i.e.,  0 i t > . 
Figure 1 shows a situation where the incumbent I is exempt (tI = 0), whereas entrant E 
is fully rated (tE = t). This will be Scenario A later on.  
Figure 1: VAT Flows in the Postal Sector 
 
 
On the cost side, operator  i faces two types of costs: (i) fixed costs  i F  and (ii) 
constant marginal costs  i c . The fraction of the fixed costs that is non-labor costs is 
denoted by  (0,1)
F
i µ ∈ , where  (0,1) i µ ∈  stands for the fraction of marginal costs that 
is non-labor. Note that operator i has to pay VAT on the fraction of non-labor costs 
derived from fixed costs, upstream and delivery costs independent of its VAT status. 
Hence,  the  VAT  status  will  crucially  determine  the  costs  faced  by  operator  i.  If 
operator  i is VAT rated with  i t t = , it can reclaim the VAT it has paid on inputs. 
Conversely, if operator i is VAT exempt with  0 i t = , it cannot reclaim the VAT it has 
paid on inputs.  
The model analyzes two scenarios. In Scenario A, the incumbent operator  I  is 
VAT exempt, i.e.,  0 I t = , while the entrant operator E is VAT rated, i.e.,  0 E t t = >  (cf. 
Figure  1).  In  Scenario  B,  the  incumbent  and  the  entrant  are  VAT  rated,  i.e., 
0 I E t t t = ≡ > . 
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Scenario A: VAT exemption for incumbent only 
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To derive the optimal pricing formula, both operators maximize their profits  
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yielding  reaction  functions  where  prices  are  strategic  complements.  Solving  the 
system  of  reaction  functions  produces  the  before-tax  prices  ( , )
A A
I E p p   of  the 
incumbent  I  and the entrant  E in Scenario A. Substituting ( , )
A A
I E p p  in the demand 
functions (1) produces equilibrium demands ( , )
A A
I E x x  in Scenario A. 
The formal results for Scenario A illustrate the trade-off that we have discussed in 
Section 1 (cost disadvantage vs. price advantage). With symmetric cost and demand, 
the  incumbent  will  have  a  larger  market  share  whenever  I γ µ > .  Note  that I µ  
depends on the  incumbent’s labor policy. Ceteris paribus, being  VAT exempt, will 
make it more profitable for the incumbent to employ workers directly rather than 
using subcontracting than would be the case were the incumbent to be VAT rated.      
In Scenario A, the following holds true:  
 (i) A higher tax rate t always yields an increase in the before-tax price 
A
I p  of the incumbent, 
while the before-tax price 
A
E p  of the entrant decreases for a reasonable range of parameters. 
 (ii)  A  higher  tax  rate  t  induces  a  decrease  in  the  equilibrium  demands  ( , )
A A
I E x x   of  the 
incumbent and the entrant for a reasonable range of parameters.  
Hence, the before-tax price of the incumbent always increases in the tax rate.  If 
the model parameters are within a reasonable range, then the before-tax price of the 
entrant decreases in the tax rate. This result can be explained by two effects. (1) As 
the  incumbent  cannot  deduct  VAT,  higher  taxes  will  directly  lead  to  higher 
production  costs.  (2)  A  higher  tax  rate  will  increase  the  incumbent’s  output  tax 
advantage, as the increased VAT rate is directly price relevant for the entrant’s non-
rated customers. Under reasonable calibration assumptions (minimal amount of non-
rated customers relative to the size of  E µ ), the entrant will be forced to reduce prices 
to offset the increase in taxes without gaining market share in return. Marginally, the 
incumbent is able to increase prices. Hence, the two effects always have the same 
direction for the incumbent while they are ambiguous for the entrant.      5 
Both  effects  will,  under  reasonable  calibration  assumptions,  negatively  affect 
demand.  
Scenario B: Both operators equally VAT rated 
In  Scenario  B,  both  the  incumbent  and  the  entrant  are  VAT  rated,  i.e., 
0 I E t t t = ≡ > . It follows that both operators can reclaim the VAT they have paid on 
inputs. The two demand functions are now of the same form and independent of the 
fraction of VAT rated inputs:  
2
1
(1 ) (1 ) ,
(1 )
i i j i j x p t p t α εα γ ε γ
β ε
  = − − + + +   −
                                                        (2) 
with  { } , i I E ∈ . Hence, the VAT regime does not distort competition between the two 
operators; consequently, Scenario B can be seen as the benchmark case for Scenario 
A’s market distortions driven by the incumbent’s VAT exemption.  
In Scenario B, the profit functions are given by 
( ) , i i i i i p c x F π = − −  
with  { } , i I E ∈ . Similar to above, the before-tax prices  ( , )
B B
I E p p  of the incumbent  I  
and the entrant  E in Scenario B are computed by solving the system of reaction 
functions  derived  from  the  profit  maximization  problem.  Equilibrium  demands 
( , )
B B
I E x x  are obtained by substituting ( , )
B B
I E p p  in the demand function (2).  
In Scenario B, the following holds true:  
 (i) A higher tax rate  t  yields a decrease in the before-tax prices  ( , )
B B
I E p p  of the incumbent 
and the entrant if the ratio of market sizes  / I E α α  is within a reasonable range of parameters. 
(ii)  A  higher  tax  rate  t   yields  a  decrease  in  the  equilibrium  demands  ( , )
B B
I E x x   of  the 
incumbent and the entrant if the ratio of cost parameters  / I E c c  is within a reasonable range 
of parameters.  
As expected, a higher VAT tax rate will increase prices under reasonable market 
conditions. While  I µ  is no longer relevant, as the incumbent can now deduct input 
taxes  too,  a  tax  increase  will  lead  to  higher  prices  for  the  non-rated  customer 
segment. To offset some of the resulting volume reductions, the operators will be 
forced to reduce their pre-tax prices, ceteris paribus. Pre-tax prices will decrease while 
after-tax prices will increase. 
In equilibrium, demand will decrease as the increase in VAT introduces a new 
cost for non-rated customers.  
A higher γ  reinforces the negative effect of t on the equilibrium demands for both 
operators.  Note  that  if  0 γ = , then  the  tax  rate  t  has  no  effect  on  the equilibrium 
demand.  
Comparison of Scenarios A and B     6 
A comparison of A and B yields the following result:  
 (i) The before-tax price of the entrant is lower in Scenario A than in Scenario B if and only if 
the proportion  γ  of VAT exempt customers is lower than the fraction  I µ  of upstream and 
delivery costs that is non-labor. 
(ii) The before-tax price of the incumbent is higher in Scenario A than in Scenario B for a 
reasonable range of parameters. 
The relation between the fraction of non-labor upstream and delivery costs and 
the proportion of VAT exempt consumers crucially determines whether the before-
tax price of the entrant is higher in Scenario A or B. Hence, if γ  is smaller than  I µ , 
the incumbent’s VAT exemption will translate into a disadvantage from the entrant’s 
point of view and force the entrant to reduce prices, ceteris paribus. Note that in most 
of today’s postal markets, this is the likely scenario, as incumbents often have a high 
percentage of labor costs (i.e.,  I µ  > 0.5) while the fraction of non-rated customers 
does not exceed 50% (i.e.,  0.5 γ ≤ ).  
While the entrant will be forced to decrease prices, ceteris paribus, the incumbent 
will be able to increase its price under reasonable calibration assumptions. Hence, 
VAT exemptions are likely to increase the competitive position of the incumbent.   
3  Calibration 
In order to predict competitive and welfare effects more precisely, we simulate 
the model using stylized data for the b-to-c bulk mail market. This is the segment 
where competition is most likely to occur after full market opening. 
We use stylized market data and assume that the incumbent I as a single operator 
in the market would deliver 1 billion items of bulk mail at an average price of 0.35 
units of money with a point-price-elasticity of -0.5. 
Effects like customer inertia, reputation effects, or switching costs in favor of the 
USP are considered by an assumed asymmetry in the calibration of demand. We 
assume that the entrant would receive 20% of the market if it were to offer the very 
same services as the incumbent.  
Parameter  γ  represents  the  fraction  of  VAT  rated  customers.  The  value  varies 
across mail segments. For example, in the c-to-c segment, γ is close to zero as private 
customers cannot reclaim VAT. We report the result for the bulk mail segment of the 
letters market and set γ = 0.5. The value is in line with the current situation in the 
German letters market, where DPWN recently reported a 50% fraction of non-rated 
customers. 
On  the  supply  side,  we  need  to  differentiate  cost  in  the  three  dimensions: 
variable/fixed,  upstream/downstream  and  labor/non-labor  costs.  The  latter  is 
relevant  for  the  deduction  of  input  VAT  (non-labor  costs  are  VAT  rated).  In  the 
monopolistic benchmark, we assume costs of 250 million currency units excluding 
input taxes. In line with demand calibration, the cost structure of the incumbent is     7 
calibrated for a hypothetical monopoly situation. Thereby, we assume a reasonable 
rate of return such that the initial price of 0.35 represents a rate-of-return regulated 
monopoly. 
Table 1 shows the major cost assumptions. With these assumptions, we are able to 
compute the necessary parameters to calibrate the two cost functions as introduced 
in (2). 
 
Table 1: Major Cost Assumptions for Base Case 
  Incumbent  Entrant 
Fraction of fixed costs  40%  20% 
µF  30%  80% 
µ  30%  80% 
Efficiency premium upstream  -  10% 
Efficiency premium downstream   -  30% 
Wage premium  -  - 
We assume that the entrant pursues a different business model in the Base Case 
with less fixed costs because it makes use of subcontracting in delivery, making the 
cost structure more flexible (variable) and yielding a larger fraction of VAT rated 
inputs. We also assume that the entrant is more efficient upstream (by more strongly 
incentivizing digital sorting) and downstream (with a reduced delivery frequency). 
The lead example of such a business model is the Dutch company Sandd. Similar 
models can be found in other liberalized postal markets. For illustration purposes, 
we assume that both players pay equal wage rates.     
The quasi-linear model framework allows for a computation of overall welfare by 
adding up consumer surplus, operator’s profits and governmental tax revenues. The 
effect  of  changing  postal  VAT  regimes  on  governmental  tax  revenues  can  be 
computed as follows. In the case that the USP is VAT exempt, the total VAT tax base 
is the value of the USP’s input goods plus the product value of the USP’s customers’ 
output that is VAT rated. If the USP is VAT rated, the tax base is the value of the 
USP’s output to VAT exempt customers in addition to the product value of the USP’s 
customers’  output  that  is  VAT  rated.  Whether  the  difference  in  the  two  cases  is 
positive  thus  depends  on  the  USP’s  value  added  and  the  fraction  of  VAT  rated 
customers. It is positive if the fraction of VAT exempt customers is larger than the 
inverse of the USP’s relative value added. In the simulation section, we will compute 
the relevant overall welfare measures.  
 
4  Numerical Results 
With  the  calibrated  model,  we  are  now  able  to  provide  some  insight  into  the 
overall competitive and welfare consequences of various tax regimes. In addition, we 
perform  sensitivity  analysis  and  derive  recommendations  for  regulators,  market 
players,  and  VAT  authorities.  Note  that  the  quantitative  results  presented  in  this 
section serve as rough guidelines only.     8 
We report simulation results for the two Scenarios A (incumbent is VAT exempt, 
tI  =  0)  and  B  (both  operators  fully  rated  at  ti  =  t  =  20%).  We  are  interested  in  (i) 
competitive  effects  measured  by  market  shares,  prices,  and  profits;  (ii)  welfare 
effects;  and  (iii)  changes  in  collected  VAT.  We  compute  the  latter  against  a 
benchmark scenario where both operators are VAT exempt (tI = tE = 0). 
4.1  Base Case  
Table  2  reports  the  results  for  the  Base  Case  as  introduced  in  Section  3. 
Furthermore, we show the figures for a “symmetric case”,  wherein the entrant is 
assumed to have the very same cost structure as the incumbent and consumers do 
not  prefer  one  operator  over  the  other  (φ  =  0.5).  The  results  that  illustrate  the 
competitive effects are shown in the upper part of the table, while those that show 
the welfare effects are reported in the lower part.   
 
Table 2: Simulation Results for Base Case and Symmetric case 
 
 
In the Base Case, Scenario A (incumbent’s VAT exemption) is more favorable for 
the incumbent. Compared to Scenario B (both operators fully rated), the incumbent’s 
profit increases substantially while the entrant’s profit decreases slightly. Both price 
and profit ratios are substantially higher for the incumbent in Scenario A, meaning 
that the incumbent can charge higher prices in Scenario A in relative terms and earn 
a higher profit at the same time. Despite its higher price level in Scenario A, the 
incumbent achieves a higher market share in the scenario. The figures show that the 
tax exemption is distorting competition significantly.3  
Nevertheless, Scenario A exhibits slightly higher overall welfare than Scenario B.4 
There are two opposite welfare effects at work: as a result of the incumbent’s VAT 
rating, the marginal tax rate increases on average. This lowers welfare. However, the 
market distortion between operators in Scenario A is abolished, and this increases 
welfare. While incremental profits are roughly compensated by opposite incremental 
tax effects (the profit decrease of the incumbent in Scenario B equals roughly the tax 
Simulation Results Base Case (µI=0.3; µE=0.8) Simulation Results Symmetric Case (all parameter even)
Scenario A Scenario B Scenario A Scenario B
Competitive Effects Competitive Effects
Incumbent Market Share 60% 59% Incumbent Market Share 51% 50%
Price Ratio (I/E) excl. VAT 137% 125% Price Ratio (I/E) excl. VAT 109% 100%
Price Ratio (I/E) incl. VAT 114% 125% Price Ratio (I/E) incl. VAT 91% 100%
Profit Ratio (I/E) 275% 178% Profit Ratio (I/E) 9% 100%
Profit Difference I -9'663'789        Profit Difference I -6'220'750       
Profit Difference E 1'156'247         Profit Difference E 1'370'551        
Welfare Effects Welfare Effects
Overall Price Level excl. VAT 0.34 0.32 Overall Price Level excl. VAT 0.32 0.31
Overall Price Level incl. VAT 0.36 0.38 Overall Price Level incl. VAT 0.35 0.37
Operator Profits 45'270'430       36'762'889       Operator Profits -9'152'028        -14'002'226    
Consumer Surplus 352'656'946    349'511'937    Consumer Surplus 411'980'809    409'195'102   
Incremental Government Tax Revenue -5'142'466        5'078'133         Incremental Government Tax Revenue 6'604'941         13'535'288      
Overall Welfare 392'784'910    391'352'958    Overall Welfare 409'433'722    408'728'163       9 
increase of the tax authority), consumers are slightly better off in Scenario A. The 
positive effect comes from the 50% non-rated customers who face lower net prices 
than in Scenario B.5  
To sum up, abolishing the incumbent’s VAT exemption levels the playing field 
while it slightly decreases overall welfare in the Base Case. The same basic results 
hold true in the symmetric case.    
4.2  Effect of Different Cost Structures µI  and µE 
The  formal  results  have  indicated  that  the  effects  crucially  depend  upon  the 
relative magnitude of parameters µI and γ. While γ is exogenously given, the cost 
structure µI  can be chosen by the operators. Table 3 reports the simulation results for 
four different combinations of µI and µE (low/low; low/high, high/low; high/high). A 
high fraction of non-labor input indicates a business model with subcontractors in 
delivery while a low number represents the use of employees. 
Recall from the analytical results in Section 2 that only µI was relevant for the 
competitive outcome.  
As  expected,  µE  is  competitively  neutral  and  only  matters  with  respect  to  tax 
revenue.  The  fraction  of  rated  inputs  for  the  entrant,  µE,  is  not  relevant  for  the 
entrant’s decisions making; a higher value of µE means larger VAT expenses that can 
be  deducted  1:1  from  the  VAT  billed  to  the  consumers.  For  the  tax  authority, 
however, the net effect matters, as we report the difference in a scenario with both 
operators being VAT exempt. Hence, a higher µE increases the input tax deduction 
that the entrant can reclaim.    
 
Table 3: Simulation Results for Different Combinations of µI and µE 
 
Simulation Results Case 1 "Labour Intense"  (µI=0.2; µE=0.2) Simulation Results Case 2 "Outsourcing Entrant (µI=0.2; µE=0.8)
Scenario A Scenario B Scenario A Scenario B
Competitive Effects Competitive Effects
Incumbent Market Share 60% 59% Incumbent Market Share 60% 59%
Price Ratio (I/E) excl. VAT 136% 125% Price Ratio (I/E) excl. VAT 136% 125%
Price Ratio (I/E) incl. VAT 113% 125% Price Ratio (I/E) incl. VAT 113% 125%
Profit Ratio (I/E) 321% 178% Profit Ratio (I/E) 321% 178%
Profit Difference I -13'332'617     Profit Difference I -13'332'617    
Profit Difference E 1'729'516         Profit Difference E 1'729'516        
Welfare Effects Welfare Effects
Overall Price Level excl. VAT 0.33 0.32 Overall Price Level excl. VAT 0.33 0.32
Overall Price Level incl. VAT 0.36 0.38 Overall Price Level incl. VAT 0.36 0.38
Operator Profits 48'365'990       36'762'889       Operator Profits 48'365'990       36'762'889      
Consumer Surplus 354'240'427    349'511'937    Consumer Surplus 354'240'427    349'511'937   
Incremental Government Tax Revenue 7'474'462         21'762'910       Incremental Government Tax Revenue -5'177'227        8'975'826        
Overall Welfare 410'080'879    408'037'735    Overall Welfare 397'429'189    395'250'651       10 
 
 
In contrast to µE, changes in µI are of great importance for the market equilibrium 
in  Scenario  A,  where  the  incumbent  is  VAT  exempt.  Here,  changes  in  µI  will  be 
directly cost-relevant; outsourcing to equally efficient partners will increase costs by 
the VAT rate times the amount of the outsourced input goods. Comparing Scenarios 
B in Table 3, µI is irrelevant for the market equilibrium (in analogy to µE above). 
However,  larger  differences  can be  seen  when  comparing  Scenarios  A.  While the 
relative prices remain about the same in equilibrium when comparing Cases 1 and 2 
against Cases 3 and 4, the incumbent’s profits in Scenario A decrease substantially. In 
other words, the incumbent’s pricing is mainly driven by demand6, and increases in 
costs are only changing its pricing decision to a minor extent. The results show that 
the incumbent’s VAT exemption is an advantage in Cases 1 and 2 only, while it is a 
disadvantage in Cases 3 and 4, where incumbent profits are lower in Scenario A. The 
results are in line with our analytical findings. Note that in Cases 1 and 2, µI < γ , 
while we have µI > γ in Cases 3 and 4. We conclude that the net competitive effect of 
an asymmetric VAT exemption crucially depends of the fraction of VAT rated inputs 
versus  the  fraction  of  non-rated  customers.  In  the  Base  Case,  the  latter  effect  is 
outweighing the former and the exempt incumbent has a competitive advantage.  
In terms of overall welfare, a higher µI decreases overall welfare in Scenario A, as 
the higher perceived cost of the incumbent reduces its profits and increases average 
prices in the market slightly (lower consumer surplus). In Scenario B, operator and 
consumer surplus remain unaffected. Abolishing the incumbent’s VAT exemption 
decreases welfare in Cases 1 and 2 (µI < γ), whereas it increases welfare in Cases 3 and 
4 (µI > γ). Hence, from a public policy point of view, the incumbent’s VAT exemption 
makes sense, where the incumbent’s fraction of non-labor costs is low. If it is high, 
the  VAT  exemption  is  welfare-reducing  because  it  induces  higher  prices.  This 
differentiation is not captured in the simulation results reported by De Donder et al. 
(2009).  
In most European countries, incumbent operators predominantly do not make use 
of outsourced labor (µI is rather low). Hence, VAT exemptions for bulk mail can be 
justified from a welfare perspective in countries with a substantial fraction of non-
Simulation Results Case 3 "Outsourcing Incumbent" (µI=0.8; µE=0.2) Simulation Results Case 4 "Outsourcing"  (µI=0.8; µE=0.8)
Scenario A Scenario B Scenario A Scenario B
Competitive Effects Competitive Effects
Incumbent Market Share 58% 59% Incumbent Market Share 58% 59%
Price Ratio (I/E) excl. VAT 138% 125% Price Ratio (I/E) excl. VAT 138% 125%
Price Ratio (I/E) incl. VAT 115% 125% Price Ratio (I/E) incl. VAT 115% 125%
Profit Ratio (I/E) 100% 178% Profit Ratio (I/E) 100% 178%
Profit Difference I 8'537'414         Profit Difference I 8'537'414        
Profit Difference E -1'758'643        Profit Difference E -1'758'643       
Welfare Effects Welfare Effects
Overall Price Level excl. VAT 0.34 0.32 Overall Price Level excl. VAT 0.34 0.32
Overall Price Level incl. VAT 0.36 0.38 Overall Price Level incl. VAT 0.36 0.38
Operator Profits 29'984'118       36'762'889       Operator Profits 29'984'118       36'762'889      
Consumer Surplus 344'849'307    349'511'937    Consumer Surplus 344'849'307    349'511'937   
Incremental Government Tax Revenue 7'958'672         -1'623'248        Incremental Government Tax Revenue -4'963'805        -14'410'332    
Overall Welfare 382'792'097    384'651'577    Overall Welfare 369'869'619    371'864'493       11 
rated  customers,  even  though  such  exemptions  distort  competition  clearly  in  the 
incumbent’s favor.    
4.3  Effect of Different Combinations of γ and µI   
The competitive effects of the Base Case are illustrated in Figure 2. The upper bar 
represents the incumbents increased profit in Scenario A in the Base Case, while the 
lower bar shows the profit decrease of the entrant (cf. Table 2). The Figure shows that 
the competitive effect of the exemption crucially depends on the incumbent’s share of 
VAT rated inputs.  
Figure 2: Illustration of Competitive Effects in Base Case 
 
 
However, a VAT exempt incumbent will always be worse off when γ is very low 
(Figure 3, left side), and it will be always better off when γ is very high (Figure 3, 
right  side).  The  first  case  represents  a  market  segment  where  only  industrial 
customers can deduct VAT, while the second case represents market segments with 
exempt customers such as banks. Private customers cannot deduct VAT, and hence, 
Figure 3, right side, also depicts the situation in the single piece mail market where 
incumbent operators remain exempt. 
Figure 3: Competitive Effects in Individual Customer Segments 
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5  Conclusions  
This  paper  sheds  light  on  the  main  competitive  impact  of  VAT  policies  while 
showing the consequences on overall welfare by presenting simulation results based 
on a calibrated quantitative model of the postal sector. This enables us to provide 
guidance on how to resolve the policy trade-off between a level playing field in the 
liberalized postal sector, consumer surplus and government tax revenues. 
With a reasonable model calibration, the USP’s VAT exemption positively affects 
the  USP’s  profit  and  reduces  the  entrant’s  profit.  Hence,  it  strengthens  the 
incumbent’s  relative  competitive  position  and  results  in  an  unlevel  playing  field. 
However,  it  has  a  positive  effect  on  consumer  surplus.  Compared  to  no  VAT 
exemption, it has a small but positive welfare effect in that the marginal tax rate is 
lower on average. 
The  VAT  regimes  in  the  postal  sector  also  have  an  effect  on  the  make-or-buy 
decisions  of  operators.  VAT  exempt  operators  have  a  higher  incentive  to  employ 
their own workers instead of subcontractors and may therefore help maintain high-
standard labor conditions in the postal sector. 
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1  Council Directive 77/388/EEC of 17 May 1977 on the harmonization of the laws of the EU member 
states relating to turnover taxes. 
2  More detailed formal results and complete proofs can be found in Dietl et al. (2010), available from 
the authors upon request. 
3  With one exception, the results are in line with recent decisions of Deutsche Post DHL to reduce its 
letter prices for business customers significantly in light of the new VAT regime in Germany as of 
July 1, 2010. However, Deutsche Post announced (for its change into Scenario B) net price decreases 
equal to the VAT rate itself, which is significantly more than we predict in our simulation.    
4  Our welfare results are different than those reported by De Donder et al. (2009), which yield higher 
welfare in Scenario B. While the authors report higher consumer surplus in Scenario A too, they 
multiply government tax revenues by 1.3 to reflect the shadow cost of public funds and therefore 
find higher overall welfare in Scenario B. As we are interested in the relative effects for the postal 
sector, we weigh all three constituents of welfare equally and generally do not account for second 
order effects in other parts of the economy.   
5  Note that this effect stems from the fact that we do not allow price differentiation between customer 
segments. Hence, the operators are forced to balance over the two customer segments yielding lower 
net prices for the rated customers. While we could extend the model to capture the relevant effects, 
regulations in many countries (e.g., Germany) will not allow differentiated prices for the incumbent.  
6 Note the oligopolistic situation in the market. The incumbent’s market power is stemming from its 
incumbent advantage and differentiated services. 